Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint

Paula Jaramillo, Cagatay Kayi and Flip Klijn

No 9425, Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE

Abstract: We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

Keywords: fairness; strategy-proofness; indivisible good; land restitution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36
Date: 2012-03-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint (2015)
Journal Article: Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint (2014)
Working Paper: Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000089:009425

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