Commons without Tragedy: Sampling Dynamics and Cooperative Resource Extraction

Juan-Camilo Cardenas, César Mantilla and Rajiv Sethi ()

No 11892, Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE

Abstract: This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a dynamic model of sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data: monotonic frequency distributions, the persistent use of strictly dominated actions, and stable heterogeneity in choices. We argue that these patterns cannot be fully accounted for by existing theories based on other-regarding preferences and norms, and that the dynamics of sampling provide a useful complementary explanation for behavior in social dilemmas.

Keywords: Common Pool Resources; Experiments; Sampling Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C91 D03 H41 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30
Date: 2013-09-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000089:011892

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