Unintended Consequences of Alternative Development Programs: Evidence From Colombia's Illegal Crop Substitution

Lucas Marín Llanes

No 18468, Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE

Abstract: While force eradication through aerial spraying has large social costs, there is no evidence of the unexpected consequences of alternative development programs. This paper suggests an unintended effect of the largest crop substitution program in the world on political violence exploiting data on the recent Colombian program. The program¿s community agreements increased the rate of social leaders¿ killings by 546 %. My findings suggest a larger effect on municipalities where leaders oppose the expansion of illicit crops, organized crime does not hold consolidated power, different armed groups are present, and land conflicts exist. This paper contributes by providing empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis that policies aimed at reducing illicit crops have unintended consequences for local communities

Keywords: Social leaders; Antidrug policies; Political violence; Colombia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40
Date: 2020-10-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000089:018468

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