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The role of information in collective decisions

Nicolás Figueroa (nicolasf@uc.cl), Jose-Alberto Guerra and Francisco Silva

No 20508, Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE

Abstract: In this paper, we study collective information acquisition in groups that make decisions using majority rule. We argue both theoretically and experimentally that the median voter theorem does not apply; in general, the level of information acquired by the group is not equal to the level of information a median voter would like to acquire individually, despite agents having single peaked preferences over information. We find t hat g roups o veracquire o r underacquire information relative to what would have been predicted by the median voter theorem depending on the levels of disagreemnent among the group members both before and after information is acquired. We also discuss the impact of the failure of the median voter theorem on efficiency.

Keywords: collective learning; median voter theorem; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D71 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 76
Date: 2022-09-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000089:020508

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