A model of school behavior: tuition fees and grading standards

Darío Maldonado

No 5106, Documentos de Trabajo from Universidad del Rosario

Abstract: This paper uses a hybrid human capital / signaling model to study grading standards in schools when tuition fees are allowed. The paper analyzes the grading standard set by a profit maximizing school and compares it with the efficient one. The paper also studies grading standards when tuition fees have limits. When fees are regulated a profit maximizing school will set lower grading standards than when they are not regulated. Credit constraints of families also induce schools to lower their standards. Given that in the model presented competition is not feasible, these results show the importance of regulation of grading standards.

Pages: 25
Date: 2008-10-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000092:005106

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