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The Limits of Hegemony: Banks, Covert Actions, and Foreign Firms

F Aldunate (), Felipe González and Mounu Prem

No 20055, Documentos de Trabajo from Universidad del Rosario

Abstract: Economic sanctions and covert actions from hegemonic states are common tools used to influence other countries. Less is known about non-state actors such as banks and their impact across borders. We use new firm-level data from Chile to document a substantial decrease in financial relations with U.S. banks after socialist Salvador Allende took office in 1970. An analysis of links with banks from other countries reveals that part of the decrease was specific to the U.S. banking sector. Business reports and stock prices suggest that firms were mostly unaffected by the destruction of links with U.S. banks. Substitution of financial relations towards state-owned banks appears to be the key mechanism to explain these findings.

Keywords: firms; banks; Cold War; United States; Salvador Allende. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 53
Date: 2022-04-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-his
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Related works:
Working Paper: The limits of hegemony: U.S. banks and Chilean firms in the Cold War (2023) Downloads
Working Paper: The Limits of Hegemony: Banks, Covert Actions, and Foreign Firms (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: The Limits of Hegemony: Banks, Covert Actions, and Foreign Firms (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: Make the Economy Scream? U.S. Banks and Foreign Firms During the Cold War (2021) Downloads
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