Principal-Agent Problem with Minimum Performance Insurance: The Case of Mandatory Individual Pension Accounts

Juan Julio

No 5222, Borradores de Economia from Banco de la Republica

Abstract: A minimum performance insurance in the Principal-Agent problemis wealth reducing to the principal. This result points to further ine±-ciencies in mandatory individual Pension Funds' contracts, particularlythe one established in the 1993's 100th Law in Colombia.

Keywords: Incentives; Agency Theory; Pensions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 2009-01-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cta and nep-ias
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000094:005222

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