Precarious Democracies, Political Negotiation and Selective Predation

Andrés Cendales () and Jhon James Mora ()

No 12422, Documentos de Trabajo from Universidad Católica de Colombia

Abstract: This article analyzes, at the subnational level, a political system in which there is a precarious democracy given that the mayor, as a member of a political organization constituting a political patron- age machine, not only co-opts civil society but also seeks to plunder municipal funds to reinforce his political hegemony, weakening and even destroying the existing institutional framework. In direct contradiction to the central theses of economic voting and orthodox political economy, the main nding of this article demonstrates that the executive, through his local power networks operating in the context of a deteriorated social structure, does not foster equitable wealth redistribution but instead promotes local empowerment processes through clientelist practices, creating a cartel government made up of the parties represented on the municipal council. The council, as a veto player, will strengthen and support the establishment of a predator state led by the executive.

JEL-codes: C72 D31 D33 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
Date: 2014-12-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000444:012422

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