A Note on The Evolution of Preferences

Oliver Pardo

No 14568, Icesi Economics Working Papers from Universidad Icesi

Abstract: This note checks the robustness of a surprising result in Dekel et al. (2007). The result states that strict Nash equilibria might cease to be evolutionary stable when agents are able to observe the opponent’s preferences with a very low probability. This note shows that the result is driven by the assumption that there is no risk for the observed preferences to be mistaken. In particular, when a player may observe a signal correlated with the opponent’s preferences, but the signal is noisy enough, all strict Nash equilibria are evolutionary stable.

Pages: 15
Date: 2015-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-hpe, nep-neu and nep-rmg
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Related works:
Journal Article: A note on “Evolution of Preferences” (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000495:014568

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