Unawareness: A Formal Theory of Unforeseen Contingencies. Part II

Salvatore Modica () and Aldo Rustichini

No 1994004, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In this paper we conclude the research initiated in Modica and Rustichini [6]. We claim here, as we did in that paper, that simple uncertainty is not an adequate model of a subject's ignorance, because a major component of it is the inability to give a complete description of the states of the world, and we provide a formal model of unawareness. In Modica and Rustichini [6j we showed a difficulty in the project, in that without a weakening of the inference rules of the logic one would face the unpleasant alternative between full awareness and full unawareness. We give a formal definition of unawareness, we study a system of modal logic where non full awareness is possible, and prove that a satisfactory solution to the problem can be found by introducing limited reasoning ability of the subject.

Date: 1994
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Working Paper: Unawareness: A Formal Theory of Unforeseen Contingencies. Part I (1993)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1994004

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