Information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings: complete information revelation in dynamic analysis

Tanguy Isaac
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Tanguy Isaac: UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Department of Economics

No 2008017, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We study information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings. We focus on the one-sided case and perform a dynamic analysis of a constant entry flow model. The same question has been studied in an identical framework in Serrano and Yosha (1993) but they limit their analysis to the stationary steady states. Blouin and Serrano (2001) study information revelation in a one-time entry model and obtain results different than Serrano and Yosha (1993). We establish that the main difference is not due to the steady state analysis but is due to the differences concerning the entry assumption.

Keywords: information revelation; asymmetric information; decentralized trade. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D49 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2008017

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