The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements

Thierry Bréchet, Johan Eyckmans (), Francois Gerard and Philippe Marbaix

No 2008061, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In this paper we analyze the negotiation strategy of the European Union regarding the formation of an international climate agreement for the post-2012 era. We use game theoretical stability concepts to explore incentives for key players in the climate policy game to join future climate agreements. We compare a minus 20 percent unilateral commitment strategy by the EU with a unilateral minus 30 percent emission reduction strategy for all Annex-B countries. Using a numerical integrated assessment climate-economy simulation model, we find that carbon leakage effects are negligible. The EU strategy to reduce emissions by 30% (compared to 1990 levels) by 2020 if other Annex-B countries follow does not induce participation of the USA with a similar 30% reduction commitment. However, the model shows that an appropriate initial allocation of emission allowances may stabilize a larger and more ambitious climate coalition than the Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period.

Keywords: climate change; coalition theory; integrated assessment model; Kyoto protocol. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C6 C7 H4 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-env and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements (2010)
Working Paper: The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements (2010)
Working Paper: The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements (2008)
Working Paper: The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2008061

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