Cooperative provision of indivisible public goods

Pierre Dehez ()

No 2010026, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: A community faces the obligation of providing an indivisible public good. Each member is capable of providing it at a certain cost and the solution is to rely on the player who can do it at the lowest cost. It is then natural that he or she be compensated by the other players. The question is to know how much they should each contribute. We model this compensation problem as a cost sharing game to which standard allocation rules are applied and related to the solution resulting from the auction procedures proposed by Kleindorfer and Sertel (1994).

Keywords: public goods; cost sharing; core; nucleolus; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 H41 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Cooperative provision of indivisible public goods (2013)
Working Paper: Cooperative provision of indivisible public goods (2013)
Working Paper: Cooperative provision of indivisible public goods (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2010026

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