The political economy of derived pension rights
Marie-Louise Leroux and
Pierre Pestieau
No 2010048, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
Abstract:
Derived pension rights exist in most Social Security systems but with variable generosity. They are mainly targeted towards non-working wives and widows and are viewed as a means to alleviate poverty among older women living alone. The purpose of this paper is to explain how they can emerge from a political economy process when the Social Security is a combination of Bismarckian and Beveridgian pillars. It also shows that derived rights tend to encourage stay-at- home wives thus revealing an unpleasant trade-o§ between female labor participation and poverty alleviation.
Keywords: social security; derived pension rights; majority voting; individualisation of pension rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-hme and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Related works:
Journal Article: The political economy of derived pension rights (2012) 
Working Paper: The political economy of derived pension rights (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2010048
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