Generalized Nash Equilibrium and market coupling in the European power system

Yves Smeers (yves.smeers@uclouvain.be), Giorgia Oggioni (oggioni@eco.unibs.it), Elisabetta Allevi (allevi@eco.unibs.it) and Siegfried Schaible (schaible_2008@gmail.com)
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Yves Smeers: CORE and School of Engineering (INMA), Université catholique de Louvain, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
Giorgia Oggioni: University of Brescia, Department of Quantitative Methods, I-25122 Brescia, Italy
Elisabetta Allevi: University of Brescia, Department of Quantitative Methods, I-25122 Brescia, Italy
Siegfried Schaible: Chung Yuan Christian University, Department of Applied Mathematics, 32023 Chung-Li, Taiwan

No 2010052, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: “Market Coupling” is currently seen as the most advanced market design in the restructuring of the European electricity market. Market coupling, by construction, introduces what is generally referred to as an incomplete market: it leaves several constraints out of the market and hence avoids pricing them. This may or may not have important consequences in practice depending on the case on hand. Quasi-Variational Inequality problems and the associated Generalized Nash Equilibrium can be used for representing incomplete markets. Recent papers propose methods for finding a set of solutions of Quasi-Variational Inequality problems. We apply one of these methods to a subproblem of market coupling namely the coordination of counter-trading. This problem is an illustration of a more general question encountered for instance in hierarchical planning in production management. We first discuss the economic interpretation of the Quasi-Variational Inequality problem. We then apply the algorithmic approach to a set of stylized case studies in order to illustrate the impact of different organizations of counter-trading. The paper emphazises the structuring of the problem. A companion paper considers the full problem of market coupling and counter-trading and presents a more extensive numerical analysis.

Keywords: Generalized Nas Equilibrium; Quasi-Variational Inequalities; market coupling; counter-trading; European electricity market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D52 D58 Q40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-eur, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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