Property rights with biological spillovers: when Hardin meets Meade

Carlotta Balestra (), Thierry Bréchet and Stéphane Lambrecht
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Carlotta Balestra: Université catholique de Louvain , CORE and Chair Lhoist Berghmans in Environmental Economics and Management, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

No 2010071, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In an overlapping generations setup we address the issue of the optimal number of property rights to allocate over a natural resource when the goal is to maximize the stock of the natural resource at the steady state. We assume that the effect of the property rights regime on the evolution of the resource is twofold: through biological spillovers and through monitoring costs. Property rights are assigned to local communities, which can decide whether to cooperate or not. The outcome in the strategic setting is hence compared to the one in the cooperative setup. A fiscal policy able to decentralize the cooperative outcome is studied.

Keywords: overlapping generations; resource management; common pool resource; spatial interdependence; strategic behaviour; cooperative behaviour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 K11 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-env
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Working Paper: Property rights with biological spillovers: when Hardin meets Meade (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2010071

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