Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods

Juan Moreno-Ternero

No 2010080, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We analyze the problem of choosing the most appropriate method for apportioning taxes in a democracy. We consider a simple theoretical model of taxation and restrict our attention to piece-wise linear tax methods, which are almost ubiquitous in advanced democracies world- wide. We show that if we allow agents to vote for any method within a rich domain of piece-wise linear methods, then a majority voting equilibrium exists. Furthermore, if most voters have income below mean income then each method within the domain can be supported in equilibrium.

Keywords: voting; taxes; majority; single-crossing; Talmud (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-pub
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Related works:
Journal Article: Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods (2011)
Working Paper: Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods (2011)
Working Paper: Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods (2010)
Working Paper: Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2010080

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