Nested potentials and robust equilibria

Hiroshi Uno ()
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Hiroshi Uno: Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

No 2011009, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: This paper introduces the notion of nested best-response potentials for complete in- formation games. It is shown that a unique maximizer of such a potential is a Nash equilibrium that is robust to incomplete information in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997, mimeo).

Keywords: incomplete information; potential games; robustness; refinements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2011009

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