Relative concerns and delays in bargaining with private information

Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

No 2013034, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We consider Rubinstein's two-person alternating-offer bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information. We investigate the effects of one party having relative concerns on the bargaining outcome and the delay in reaching an agreement. We find that facing an opponent having stronger relative concerns only hurts the bargainer when she is stronger than her opponent. In addition, we show that an increase of one party's relative concerns will decrease the maximum delay in reaching an agreement.

Keywords: relative concerns; alternating-offer bargaining; private information; maximal delays (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D60 J50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-07-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2013.html (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information (2013)
Working Paper: Relative concerns and delays in bargaining with private information (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2013034

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().