Social awareness and duopoly competition

Belhadj Nada, Jean Gabszewicz and Ornella Tarola
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Belhadj Nada: ISG, University of Tunis
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Nada Ben Elhadj

No 2013043, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: Human actions are often guided both by individual rationality and by social norms. In this paper we explore how duopoly market competition values the variants of a product, when these variants embody at different levels the requirements derived from some social norm. In a model where preferences of consumers depend partially on the levels of compliance of the variants with the social norm, we characterize the equilibrium path along which firms choose sequentially their level of compliance and their price.

Keywords: social norms; others regarding preferences; vertical product differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 L13 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-09-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2013043

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