Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation

Nicolas Carayol, Rémy Delille () and Vincent Vannetelbosch
Additional contact information
Rémy Delille: GREThA, Université de Bordeaux IV, France

No 2014004, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We propose a concept to study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted and allocations are determined endogenously. A set of networks is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if there exists an allocation rule and a bargaining threat such that (i) there is no farsighted improving path from one network inside the set to another network inside the set, (ii) from any network outside the set there is a farsighted improving path to some network inside the set, (iii) the value of each network is allocated among players so that players suffer or benefit equally from being linked to each other compared to the allocation they would obtain at their respective credible bargaining threat. We show that the set of strongly efficient networks is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if the allocation rule is anonymous and component efficient and the value function is top convex. Moreover, the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule emerges endogenously.

Keywords: farsighted players; stability; equal bargaining power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 C70 D20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-02-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2014.html (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation (2015)
Working Paper: Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation (2015)
Working Paper: Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation (2015)
Working Paper: Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2014004

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().