Optimal enforcement of competition policy: the commitments procedure under uncertainty

Axel Gautier () and Nicolas Petit

No 2014063, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: Since the introduction of a formal commitments procedure in EU an- titrust policy (Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003), the European Commission has extensively settled cases of alleged anticompetitive practices. In this paper, we use a formal model of law enforcement (Be- bchuk, 1984; Shavell, 1988) to identify the optimal procedure to resolve cases in a context of uncertainty related to the law (L-uncertainty) and to the facts (F-uncertainty). We show that commitments are subop- timal when L-uncertainty is important. Furthermore, the generalized use of commitments creates an additional risk of under-enforcement when F-uncertainty is significant.

Keywords: Competition Policy; European Commission; Settlements; Commitments; Law Enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K41 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal enforcement of competition policy: the commitments procedure under uncertainty (2018)
Working Paper: Optimal enforcement of competition policy: The commitments procedure under uncertainty (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2014063

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