School Choice with Farsighted Students

Ata Atay, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch
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Vincent Vannetelbosch: Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium

No 2022025, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is already sufficient for stabilizing the matching obtained from the TTC.

Keywords: School choice; top trading cycle; stable sets; farsighted students (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47
Date: 2022-11-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: School Choice with Farsighted Students (2022)
Working Paper: School choice with farsighted students (2022)
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