Competition leverage: How the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment

Michiel Bijlsma, Gijsbert Zwart and Jan Boone

No 181, CPB Discussion Paper from CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis

Abstract: In this paper, the authors study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high-risk consumers are less likely to switch insurer than low-risk consumers. First, they find that insurers still have an incentive to select even if risk adjustment perfectly corrects for cost differences among consumers. Consequently, the outcome is not efficient even if cost differences are fully compensated. To achieve first best, risk adjustment should overcompensate for serving high-risk agents to take into account the difference in markups among the two types. Second, the difference in switching behavior creates a trade off between efficiency and consumer welfare. Reducing the difference in risk adjustment subsidies to high and low types increases consumer welfare by leveraging competition from the elastic low-risk market to the less elastic high-risk market. Finally, mandatory pooling can increase consumer surplus even further, at the cost of efficiency.

JEL-codes: G22 I11 I18 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Competition leverage: how the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment (2014)
Working Paper: Competition leverage: how the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment (2011)
Working Paper: Competition Leverage: How the Demand Side Affects Optimal Risk Adjustment (2011)
Working Paper: Competition Leverage: How the Demand Side Affects Optimal Risk Adjustment (2011)
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