Team incentives in public organisations; an experimental study

Pierre Koning, Jana Vyrastekova and Sander Onderstal

No 60, CPB Discussion Paper from CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis

Abstract: Using a simple production game, we investigate whether public firms perform better when they increase the power of their workers’ incentive schemes. Using a simple production game, we investigate whether public firms perform better when they increase the power of their workers’ incentive schemes. In a laboratory experiment, subjects choose between a ‘public firm’ and a ‘private firm’ with team and individual incentives, respectively. When exposed to individual incentives, workers in the public firm increase effort in one parametrisation, but show a decrease in another. One reason for the latter observation is that reciprocators self-select in the public firm, rendering cooperation profitable.

JEL-codes: C7 C9 L3 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-lab, nep-pbe and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpb:discus:60

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