The impact of competition on productive efficiency in European railways
Gertjan Driessen,
Mark Lijesen and
Machiel Mulder
No 71, CPB Discussion Paper from CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
Abstract:
This paper empirically explores the relationship between competition design and productive efficiency in the railway industry. We use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to construct efficiency scores, and explain these scores, using variables reflecting institutional factors and competition design. Our results suggest that competitive tendering improves productive efficiency, which is in line with economic intuition as well as with expectations on the design of competition. We also find that free entry lowers productive efficiency. A possible explanation for this result is that free entry may disable railway operators to reap economies of density. Our final result is that more autonomy of management lowers productive efficiency. Most of the incumbent railway companies are state owned and do not face any competitive pressure. As a consequence, increased independence without sufficient competition and adequate regulation may deteriorate incentives for productive efficiency.
JEL-codes: D24 H42 L22 L25 L33 L92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-eec, nep-eff, nep-pbe and nep-tid
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cpb.nl/sites/default/files/publicaties ... uropean-railways.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpb:discus:71
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CPB Discussion Paper from CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().