Simple Sufficient Conditions for Weak Reciprocal Upper Semi-Continuity in Extended Games

Blake Allison (), Adib Bagh and Jason Lepore ()
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Blake Allison: Department of Economics, Emory University
Adib Bagh: Department of Economics and Mathematics, University of Kentucky
Jason Lepore: Department of Economics, California Polytechnic State University

No 1608, Working Papers from California Polytechnic State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We provide a sufficient condition for a game with discontinuous payoffs to be weakly reciprocally upper semi-continuous in mixed strategies. This condition is imposed on the individual payoffs and not on their sum, and it can be readily verified in a large class of games even when the sum of payoffs in such games is not upper semi-continuous. We apply our result to establish the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in probabilistic voting competitions when candidates have heterogenous beliefs about the distribution of the voters.

Keywords: Better reply security; extended games; Weak reciprocal upper semi-continuity; Nash equilibria; Probabilistic voting models. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpl:wpaper:1608

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