Monotone Comparative Statics in the Calvert-Wittman Model

Francisco Rodríguez and Eduardo Zambrano

No 2104, Working Papers from California Polytechnic State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we show that when policy-motivated parties can commit to a particular platform during a uni-dimensional electoral contest where valence issues do not arise there must be a positive association between the policies preferred by candidates and the policies adopted in expectation in the lowest and the highest equilibria of the electoral contest. We also show that this need not be so if the parties cannot commit to a particular policy. The implication is that evidence of a negative relationship between enacted and preferred policies is suggestive of parties that hold positions from which they would like to move from yet are unable to do so.

Keywords: Credibility and commitment; political competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://drive.google.com/file/d/1KK0AQoGPnrwuFjnZ_ ... /view?usp=drive_link First version, 2021 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Monotone comparative statics in the Calvert–Wittman model (2022)
Working Paper: Monotone Comparative Statics in the Calvert-Wittman Model (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpl:wpaper:2104

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