The Law NOME: Some Implications for the French Electricity Markets

Anna Creti, Jerome Pouyet and Maria-Eugenia Sanin

No 1102, CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) from CEPREMAP

Abstract: The French law “Nouvelle Organisation du Marché de l’Électricité” makes available, at a regulated price, withdrawal rights to source low-cost electricity production from nuclear plants owned by the incumbent. Downstream market retailers benefit from such a measure, up to a given amount fixed by the law, to compete on a level playing field with the historical supplier. Our analysis assesses whether this production release programme is likely to result in a lower retail price. We show that whether pro-competitive effects arise depends not only on the amount of the preassigned capacity but also on the rules used to allocate it to retailers.

Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2011-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-law and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpm:docweb:1102

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