Top Executives, Turnover and Firm Performance in Germany

Steven Kaplan ()

CEPR Financial Market Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper examines executive turnover -- both for management and supervisory boards -- and its relation to firm performance in the largest companies in Germany in the 1980s. Turnover of the management board increases significantly with poor stock performance and particularly poor (i.e. negative) earnings, but is unrelated to sales growth and earnings growth. These turnover- performance relations do not vary with measures of stock ownership and bank voting power. Supervisory board appointments and turnover also increase with poor stock performance, but are unrelated to other measures of performance.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Corporate Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (126)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany (1994)
Working Paper: Top Executives, Turnover and Firm Performance in Germany (1993)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprfm:0045

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