Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

No 2013-09, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: If a player is removed from a game, what keeps the payoff of the remaining players unchanged? Is it the removal of a special player or its presence among the remaining players? This article answers this question in a complement study to Kamijo and Kongo (2012). We introduce axioms of invariance from player deletion in presence of a special player. In particular, if the special player is a nullifying player (resp. dummifying player), then the equal division value (resp. equal surplus division value) is characterized by the associated axiom of invariance plus efficiency and balanced cycle contributions. There is no type of special player from such a combination of axioms that characterizes the Shapley value.

Keywords: weighted division values; equal division; weighted surplus division values; equal surplus division; Shapley value; null player; nullifying player; dummifying player; invariance from player deletion in presence of a special player (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2013-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
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https://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/uploads/wp/WP-2013-09.pdf First version, 2013 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Preserving or removing special players: What keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games? (2015)
Working Paper: Preserving or removing special players: What keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games? (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crb:wpaper:2013-09

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