On compensation schemes for data sharing within the european REACH legislation

Sylvain Béal and Marc Deschamps

No 2014-01, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: Article 30 of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 concerns the sharing of data between users of a chemical substance. We study this bargaining problem by means of a special class of games in coalitional form called data games (Dehez and Tellone, 2013). For such problems, compensation schemes specify how the data owners should be compensated by the agents in needs of data. On the class of data games, the Core, the Nucleolus and the Shapley value provide relevant compensation schemes. We provide three comparable axiomatic characterizations of the set of all (additive) compensation schemes belonging to the Core, of the Nucleolus and of the Shapley value. The axioms reflects principles of various theories of justice.

Keywords: REACH; Data sharing problem; Core; Nucleolus; Shapley value; Pooling; Compensation; Reasonableness; Invariance to deleting non-exclusive data; Equal treatment of Equals; Invariance to enlarging the owner set; Equal concessions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D71 K32 L65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2014-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On compensation schemes for data sharing within the European REACH legislation (2016)
Working Paper: On compensation schemes for data sharing within the European REACH legislation (2016)
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