Efficient extensions of the Myerson value

Sylvain Béal, André Casajus () and Frank Huettner ()
Additional contact information
André Casajus: Economics and Information Systems, HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management and LSI Leipziger Spieltheoretisches Institut, Leipzig, Germany
Frank Huettner: Economics and Information Systems, HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management and LSI Leipziger Spieltheoretisches Institut, Leipzig, Germany

No 2015-01, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: We study values for transferable utility games enriched by a communication graph (CO-games) where the graph does not necessarily affect the productivity but can in?uence the way the players distribute the worth generated by the grand coalition. Thus, we can envisage values that are efficient instead of values that are component efficient. For CO-games with connected graphs, efficiency and component efficiency coincide. In particular, the Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) is efficient for such games. Moreover, fairness is characteristic of the Myerson value. We identify the value that is efficient for all CO-games, coincides with the Myerson value for CO-games with connected graphs, and satisfies fairness.

Keywords: communication graph; fairness; efficiency; efficient extension; Shapley value; Myerson value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2015-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Efficient extensions of the Myerson value (2015)
Working Paper: Efficient extension of the Myerson value (2015)
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