Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure

Sylvain Béal, Anna Khmelnitskaya () and Philippe Solal
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Anna Khmelnitskaya: Saint-Petersburg State University, Faculty of Applied Mathematics, Saint-Petersburg, Russia

No 2015-02, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: TU games with two-level communication structure, in which a two-level communication structure relates fundamentally to the given coalition structure and consists of a communication graph on the collection of the a priori unions in the coalition structure, as well as a collection of communication graphs within each union, are considered. For such games we introduce two families of two-step values inspired by the two-step procedures staying behind the Owen value (Owen, 1977) and the two-step Shapley value (Kamijo, 2009) for games with coalition structures. Our approach is based on the unified treatment of several component efficient values for games with communication structure and it generates two-stage solution concepts that apply component efficient values for games with communication structure on both distribution levels. Comparable axiomatic characterizations are provided.

Keywords: TU game with two-level communication structure; Owen value; two-step Shapley value; component efficiency; deletion link property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2015-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure (2018)
Working Paper: Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure (2018)
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