A cooperative game approach to integrated healthcare

Guillaume Sekli ()
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Guillaume Sekli: CRESE EA3190, Univ. Bourgogne Franche-Comté, F-25000 Besançon, France

No 2022-06, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: This article focuses on the sharing of a bundled payment for integrated healthcare. We model this problem by means of cooperative game theory. Various approaches are considered, each of which gives rise to a particular cooperative game, and make it possible to take the chronology of medical events into account. The Shapley value, a priority rule and a proportional allocation rule are used to (partially) refund the healthcare professionals on the basis of the fee paid by the patient and we establish some properties. We also show that the core of some of these aformentioned games is non-empty and can contain these allocation rules.

Keywords: Integrated Healthcare; Healthcare chain; Chronic diseases; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2022-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hea
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