Sharing Losses in Dictator and Ultimatum Games: A Meta-Analysis

François Cochard () and Alexandre Flage ()
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François Cochard: Université de Franche-Comté, CRESE, F-25000 Besançon, France
Alexandre Flage: Université de Lorraine, Université de Strasbourg, CNRS, BETA, F-54000 Nancy, France

No 2023-09, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: Are people less socially oriented when sharing losses instead of gains? This paper reports the findings of a meta-analysis of 33 studies with 114 estimates from ultimatum and dictator games in which participants share losses (of money, time, or even physical well-being) instead of gains. We provide evidence that dictators leave significantly more to receivers when sharing losses. Proposers are also fairer when sharing losses, but the result is only significant when protocol biases are controlled for. Receivers, on the other hand, demand significantly more in the loss-sharing ultimatum game than in the gain-sharing game. They also demand significantly more when the strategy method is employed. Moreover, we found that non-students are more generous and fairer when sharing losses than students. Finally, we found that, whether sharing a loss of time, a loss of money, or physical pain, players’ behaviors do not differ in terms of the percentage of loss shared or demanded.

Keywords: Dictator game; Ultimatum Game; Loss-Sharing; Meta-analysis; Non-monetary domain. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C13 C91 D03 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2023-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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