A Characterization of the Myerson value for cooperative games on voting structures

Clinton Gubong Gassi ()
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Clinton Gubong Gassi: Université de Franche-Comté, CRESE, UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France

No 2024-10, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: We consider cooperative games where the coalition structure is given by the set of winning coalitions of a simple game. This type of games models some real-life situations in which some agents have economic performances while some others are endowed with a political power. On this class of cooperative games, the Myerson value has been identified as the Harsanyi power solution associated to the Equal Division power index and has been characterized in the large class of Harsanyi power solutions with respect to the associated power index. In this paper, we provide a characterization of the Myerson value for this class of games without focusing on the whole family of Harsanyi power solutions and therefore, without taking into account any power index. We identify the Myerson value as the only allocation rule that satisfies efficiency, additivity, modularity, extra-null player property, and Equal Treatment of Veto.

Keywords: TU-game; Voting structure; Harsanyi dividends; Harsanyi power solution; Myerson value. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2024-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
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