School Choice with Preference Rank Classes

Nickesha Ayoade () and Szilvia Pápai ()
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Nickesha Ayoade: Concordia University

No 20002, Working Papers from Concordia University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We introduce and study a large family of rules for many-to-one matching problems, the Preference Rank Partitioned (PRP) rules. PRP rules are student-proposing Deferred Acceptance rules, where the schools select among applicants in each round taking into account both the students' preferences and the schools' priorities. In a PRP rule each school first seeks to select students based on priority rank classes, and subsequently based on preference rank classes. PRP rules include many well-known matching rules, such as the standard Deferred Acceptance rule, the Boston rule, the Chinese Application-Rejection rules of Chen and Kesten (2017), the Taiwan Deduction rules of Dur et al. (2018), and the French Priority rules of Bonkoungou (2019), in addition to matching rules that have not been studied yet. We analyze the stability, efficiency and incentive properties of PRP matching rules in this unified framework.

Keywords: matching; school choice; Deferred Acceptance; Boston rule; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D78 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2020-02-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-des and nep-ure
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Journal Article: School choice with preference rank classes (2023)
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