Incentive compatible mechanisms in multiprincipal multiagent games

Gwenaël Piaser ()
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Gwenaël Piaser: Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg

LSF Research Working Paper Series from Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg

Abstract: It is argued that the revelation principle in multi-principal multi-agent games cannot be generalized. In other words, one cannot restrict attention to incentive compatible mechanisms, even if the concept of information is enlarged.

Keywords: Direct Mechanims; Incentive compatible; Multiprincipals. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
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