Stochastic and Deterministic Menus in Common Agency games: A corrected version

Gwenaël Piaser ()
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Gwenaël Piaser: Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg

LSF Research Working Paper Series from Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg

Abstract: In this note we argue that in Common Agency games, the restriction to deterministic menus is crutial.We give an simple example (complete information, no moral hazard) in which an equilibrium is not robust to the introduction of stochastic menus.

Keywords: Delegation Principle; Menus; Lotteries. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crf:wpaper:08-03

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