Ownership Concentration, Family Control and Performance of Firms

Malika Hamadi ()
Additional contact information
Malika Hamadi: Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg

LSF Research Working Paper Series from Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg

Abstract: This paper explores the relationship between firm performance, measured by Tobin's Q and very powerful controlling shareholders in a sample of Belgian listed firms. The paper shows that overall the largest shareholders have a negative effect on firm performance. Nevertheless, in family firms the effect of large controlling shareholders on performance is positive except when they are organized in voting blocks. Firms related to coordination centers display higher performance associated with large shareholders. The paper shows that the presence of a second shareholder in the firm has no significant effect.

Keywords: Ownership concentration, family firms, voting blocks, Tobin's q "Classification-JEL: G3; G32; G34" (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-sbm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.lsf.lu/eng/content/download/1525/7537/file/10-03.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crf:wpaper:10-03

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LSF Research Working Paper Series from Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martine Zenner ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).