The Case for Using Subsidies for Retirement Plans to Fix Social Security

Andrew G. Biggs and Alicia H. Munnell

Issues in Brief from Center for Retirement Research

Abstract: Tax preferences for saving in retirement plans are expensive – about $185 billion in 2020, according to Treasury estimates. Strikingly, they also seem a bad deal for taxpayers, primarily benefiting high earners while failing to significantly boost national saving. Thus, the case is strong for eliminating or reducing these preferences. The resulting increase in tax revenues could be reallocated to fixing Social Security’s finances.

Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2024-01
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