The Provision of Wage Incentives: A Structural Estimation Using Contracts Variation

Xavier D'Haultfoeuille and Philippe Février (philippe.fevrier@ensae.fr)
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Philippe Février: CREST

No 2011-29, Working Papers from Center for Research in Economics and Statistics

Keywords: incentives; asymmetric information; optimal contracts; nonparametric identification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50
Date: 2011-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-lab
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http://crest.science/RePEc/wpstorage/2011-29.pdf Crest working paper version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The provision of wage incentives: A structural estimation using contracts variation (2020)
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