Majority Judgment vs. Approval Voting

Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki ()
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Rida Laraki: CNRS, LAMSADE, Université Paris-Dauphine; PSL; Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool

No 2018-15, Working Papers from Center for Research in Economics and Statistics

Abstract: Majority judgment (MJ) and approval voting (AV) are compared in theory and practice. Criticisms of MJ and claims that AV is superior are refuted. The two primary criticisms have been that MJ is not "Condorcet-consistent" and that it admits the "no-show" paradox. That MJ is not Condorcet-consistent is a good property shared with AV: the domination paradox shows majority rule may well err in an election between two. Whereas the no-show paradox is in theory possible with MJ it is as a practical matter impossible. For those who believe this extremely rare phenomenon is important it is proven that MJ with three grades cannot admit the no-show paradox. In contrast; AV suffers from serious drawbacks because voters can only "tick" or "approve" candidates at best only Approve or Disapprove each candidate. With AV voters cannot express their opinions adequately; experiments show that Approve is not the opposite of Disapprove; and although AV does not admit the no-show paradox it admits the very closely allied "no-show syndrome and insensitivity." Two is too few. Substantive debate must concern three or more grades.

Keywords: Majority judgment; majority rule; approval voting; Condorcetconsistency; domination paradox; no-show paradox; no-show syndrome. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2018-10-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Majority Judgment vs. Approval Voting (2022)
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