Regulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources

Anastasios Xepapadeas

No 312, Working Papers from University of Crete, Department of Economics

Abstract: The paper jointly models the evolution of compliance with regulation and the evolution of a CPR stock, by combining replicator dynamics describing compliance with harvesting rules, with resource stock dynamics. This evolutionary approach suggests that coexistence, in long run equilibrium, of both cooperative and non-cooperative rules under regulation is possible. Stock effects on profits and a certain structure of auditing probabilities could imply the emergence of a limit cycle in areas of low stock levels, as an equilibrium outcome for compliance and the biomass stock. It might be easier for the regulator to obtain full compliance under precommitment to fixed auditing probabilities.

Keywords: Common pool resources (CPR); harvesting; regulation; replicator dynamics; compliance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 Q20 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-evo, nep-reg and nep-res
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Regulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crt:wpaper:0312

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