Conflict of interest as a barrier to local accountability

Abigail Barr and Andrew Zeitlin

No 2011-13, CSAE Working Paper Series from Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford

Abstract: Using a specially designed lab-type experiment conducted in the field, we compare the willingness of head teachers, centrally appointed public servants, and community representatives to hold Ugandan primary school teachers to account. We find no difference in the willingness of centrally appointed public servants and community representatives. However, head teachers are significantly less willing to punish teachers whose performance falls 20 to 40 percent below a generally accepted benchmark. In addition, head teachers are twice as likely to punish teachers who “over-perform”, a behaviour akin to punishing rate-busters.

Keywords: Public service; Education; Experiments; Africa; Accountability; Methodology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 I29 O12 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-exp and nep-lab
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:csa:wpaper:2011-13

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