Fighting for votes: theory and evidence on the causes of electoral violence

Olivier Sterck

No 2015-19, CSAE Working Paper Series from Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford

Abstract: Electoral violence is widespread in developing countries. However, its causes are poorly understood. I present a theoretical model of electoral competition in which electoral violence is more likely to emerge if (1) the electoral bases of leading parties are of similar size, implying that political competition is tight, and (2) polarization between violent supporters of leading parties is high. The relative importance of these two conditions varies with the type of electoral violence (e.g. clashes, intimidation or murders). The predictions of the model are tested and validated using a unique dataset on electoral violence during the 2010 elections in Burundi. I compare the incidence of electoral violence between neighboring municipalities, relying on the fact that neighboring municipalities more likely to have similar unobserved characteristics. In line with the theoretical model, I find that a one-standard-deviation increase in political competition induces a 35 to 66% increase in the predicted number of violent episodes. A one-standard-deviation increase in ex-rebels’ polarization induces a 40 to 50% increase in the predicted number of violent episodes.

Keywords: Electoral violence; Polarization; Political competition; Demobilization; Burundi (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 H56 O12 O17 O55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Fighting for Votes: Theory and Evidence on the Causes of Electoral Violence (2020)
Working Paper: Fighting for votes: theory and evidence on the causes of electoral violence (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:csa:wpaper:2015-19

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