The Political Economy of Migration Enforcement: Domestic versus Border Control

Giovanni Facchini and Cecilia Testa ()
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Cecilia Testa: Royal Holloway University of London

No 371, Development Working Papers from Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano

Abstract: We study migration policy enforcement by an elected government. The policy-maker faces uncer-tainty on the supply of migrants, but has more information than the public on its preferences and the extent and effectiveness of its enforcement activities. We show that a utilitarian government prefer-ring more migrants than the majority may find it optimal to set a restrictive target to please the me-dian voter, while relaxing its enforcement to admit more foreigners in a concealed way. Lax en-forcement may be achieved either by deploying inadequate resources on cost–effective activities (domestic enforcement) or by allocating a larger budget on less effective tools (border enforcement). The attractiveness of one instrument over the other depends on the size of the immigrant flow: if the supply is large, border enforcement might be preferred because, although more costly, it brings the number of migrants closer to the utilitarian optimum. Hence, re–election concerns might provide a rationale for the widespread use of less a effective enforcement tool, such as border control.

Keywords: Illegal immigration; Immigration Policy; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 J61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int, nep-mig and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Political Economy of Migration Enforcement: Domestic Versus Border Control (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:csl:devewp:371

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