Job search theory and the slippery slope framework: an attempt to integration

Gaetano Lisi

No 2011-02, Working Papers from Universita' di Cassino, Dipartimento di Economia e Giurisprudenza

Abstract: Recently, attempts have been made to formalize the assumptions of the ‘slippery slope’ framework about the effects of trust (in) and power (of) tax authorities on tax compliance. In this sense, the proposed theoretical work introduces the basic insights of the ‘slippery slope’ framework into the benchmark macroeconomic model of the labour market with tax evasion. The key result of this integration is the following: with the right mix of policy tools of deterrence and trust in tax authorities, a reduction in tax evasion may increase labour market tightness and decrease unemployment.

Keywords: tax evasion; tax compliance; power and trust; job search theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H26 J64 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2011-02-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-dge and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://dipeg-wpe.unicas.it/dipse/files/wp201102.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:css:wpaper:2011-02

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Universita' di Cassino, Dipartimento di Economia e Giurisprudenza Dipartimento di Economia e Giurisprudenza Via S. Angelo Loc. Folcara 03043 Cassino (FR) - Italy. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Gennaro Zezza ().