Parents Know Better: Sorting on Match Effects in Primary School

Marco Ovidi

No def121, DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza from Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE)

Abstract: I show that parents select schools by considering attributes of the student-school match that improve the learning outcomes beyond average school quality. Using the centralized algorithm for offers to primary school in London, I compare the achievement of students who are as good as randomly enroled in schools ranked differently in their application. Enroling at the most-preferred school versus an institution ranked lower increases achievement by 0.10 SD beyond school value-added among students with similar characteristics. Only a small part of the match effects of parental choice can be explained by student’s characteristics such as gender, ability, or socioeconomic status.

Keywords: Centralised assignment; Deferred acceptance; School choice; School effectiveness. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H75 I21 I24 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 80
Date: 2022-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu and nep-ure
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